Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) The threat of WMD is nothing new, but the significance of 9-11 has raised public consciousness to a level that demands our government to continuously address the threat, even though throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) the emphasis and resources required to implement a successful strategy remain a lower-tiered priority.
The National Strategies of the United States all address the potential threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to our national security. National and military strategies have been developed to focus extensively on combating weapons of mass destruction. However, reaching consensus throughout the government on what the WMD threat entails remains elusive. While various strategies/policy mandate our need to improve our ability to respond and mitigate the effects of WMD, actual implementation is not a high priority for the Department of Defense (DoD). The U.S.
Army should serve DoD as the Executive Agent for implementing critical aspects of our strategy. Never has there been more relevance for the mission of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps, however, the paradigm of how the Chemical Corps is structured and utilized creates capability gaps that inhibit response to the WMD threat to the homeland and abroad. Some improvements have been initiated; however, additional focus is required. Currently an imbalance exists in the consequence management capabilities of the active and reserve components. This paper examines the Combating WMD Strategy and the current DoD capabilities to support national strategy. Capability gaps are identified and recommendations are included.
COMBATING WMD: IS IT REALLY A PRIORITY?
Since the terrorist strikes of 9-11, a great deal of emphasis, at least in words, has been given to combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which, depending on what definition you read, includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE). Our National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy, all address the threat of WMD and the need to effectively counter this threat. As a supporting document to these strategies, we now have a National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and a National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. On the surface it would seem that our strategies to combat WMD is very explicit, however, how the strategy is being implemented leaves the impression that it is implicit in nature; suggested and not directed. Richard B. Doyle, an associate professor with the Naval Post Graduate School asks the question of whether or not our published strategies really have substance and can what is written actually succeed? Do we practice what we preach? Doyle notes, "For the most part, they (our published strategies) tell the world what a government intends to do, strategically. Whether it consistently acts on these principles is another matter-a question of implicit strategy." 1 The threat of WMD is nothing new, but the significance of 9-11 has raised public consciousness to a level that demands our government to continuously address the threat, even though throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) the emphasis and resources required to implement a successful strategy remain a lower-tiered priority. This is not to say that no progress is being made; in fact many advances have been made in regards to consequence management in support of a domestic WMD terrorist strike. However, upon close examination it appears that many of the actions implemented are merely modest attempts to check the block for doing something rather than implementing a strategy that addresses the threat of WMD holistically. Too many capability gaps exist. Why is this? For the most part it is due to a general lack of senior leader emphasis that for years has plagued CBRN defense. Within DoD, the conclusions of a March, 1996 General Accounting Office Report to Congress (GAO), "Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems," continue eleven years later to be very valid. 2 The Army, as the DoD Executive Agent for CBRN defense, must be the champion for implementing and supporting the Combating WMD Strategy in a manner that is realistic and credible. The Army, through the U.S. Army Chemical Corps, has the greatest number of specialists and the expertise to strategically address the threat of WMD, particularly if the term WMD is primarily applicable to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive threats. The term "WMD" further complicates strategy due to its ambiguity. This paper examines the definition of WMD, the threat and strategy to counter the threat, and the role of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps in combating this threat. Capability gaps are identified and recommendations are provided to better execute our national and military strategies. contention of a lack of understanding of these weapons by our senior leadership has some validity; however, the use of the term "WMD" is borne more of political reasons than it is for correctly defining the threat.
Weapons of Mass
The phrase "weapons of mass destruction"…is an amorphous one, changing meaning according to the whims of the speaker. Raising the specter of WMD is more a way by which politicians assign blame or take a stand on seemingly objective moral standards than a way by which they assess a particular weapons system.
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WMD is a catch-all term that captures the imagination by conjuring an image of unimaginable death and destruction. Playing on public fear, the intent is to induce support for any policy or action against any adversary we identify as either possessing WMD or attempting to acquire WMD according to our terms, regardless of the specific weapon or weapons and their effects in question. Do we truly have an effective strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction or does the acronym WMD really stand for "words of mass distraction".
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The term "WMD" has propagated into everyday language and is a major focus for problematic. An argument has been made that the inclusion of high-yield explosives could be applied to most weapons used by the military thereby placing limits on DoD and hindering future disarmament negotiations. 13 Precedence for categorizing high-yield explosives as WMD has already been made with the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the case of Richard Reid's attempt at using a shoe bomb to destroy an aircraft. The Strategy: What are the Priorities?
The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction identifies three principal pillars, or in essence the ways to achieve the ends: counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management. While not stated, it is apparent that the order in which the pillars are listed is also the priority. What is lacking due to the ambiguity of WMD is a priority within the context of each pillar. CBRN is addressed with each pillar, but without regard to weapons effects. High yield explosives are not even addressed. Additionally, within DoD, the strategy lends itself to confusion over jurisdiction between the antiterrorism/force protection and the CBRN defense communities when CBRN or CBRNE is addressed as a terrorist weapon of choice. 16 The strategic concept of the three pillars is also flawed from a feasibility, acceptability, and suitability standpoint. Counterproliferation involves all activities to defeat or deter WMD employment against the United States. While the concept of counterproliferation is sound, its focus is too broad, covering a very large range of activities and efforts to combat proliferation. These activities include: defense, deterrence, defusing, and destruction. This wide range of options creates difficulty from a resourcing and priority standpoint. With the pillar of nonproliferation, the ability to achieve meaningful results may be limited to select nation state actors. An argument can be made that with the definition of WMD, any strategy incorporating nonproliferation of WMD is pointless, save for specific types of WMD such as nuclear weapons. Given the globalization and ready access to large amounts of explosives, toxic industrial chemicals, toxic industrial material, and radiation generating equipment throughout the world, nearly every nation has a WMD capability now and the resources are readily available to non state actors (terrorist). How can you impose or garner meaningful nonproliferation support for something that has already proliferated?
Of the three pillars, consequence management is the one aspect of the strategy that we can make a quantifiable difference. In some respects, consequence management, which is the ability to effectively respond and mitigate the effects of WMD, can also serve as a deterrent. Over and over we continually hear from top analyst and politicians that "the question of WMD employment against the U.S. is not a question of if, but when". Recognizing that use of these weapons against the U.S. is only a matter of time, defensive measures and response capabilities to mitigate damage and save lives should be our top priority. To date, very little has been done to better posture the active component to conduct consequence management support at home or abroad.
Perhaps a better stated policy or set of ways to achieve our national objectives in regards to combating WMD would be to deter, contain, and engage. At the highest levels, our senior leaders are again beset with competing programs, priorities, and demands. For most, the mindset of CBRN being a low priority does not change. While DoD generally has concurred with GAO findings and recommendations, little action has been taken to implement major changes to close the gap between preparedness and stated national priorities. 22 Mauroni points out that the failure to resolve identified CBRN shortcomings has been an often repeated cycle. DOD has had the habit of waiting until an incident occurs or the threat is imminent to boldly proclaim, "We need to fix our shortfalls." However, years go by and nothing happens. 
Strengthening CBRN (E) Defense
Change is required in order to effectively support our National Strategy and protect the homeland as well as our forces and interests abroad from the affects of CBRNE weapons. As mentioned, the first step is to get rid of the term WMD and state our strategy explicitly as Combating CBRNE. The Army, with the largest number of technical specialist for matters relating to CBRNE defense, must take the lead. As such, the U.S. Army Chemical Corps with a total authorized Corps strength in excess of 22,000 officer and enlisted CBRN specialist should be the focal point. 28 The Chemical
Corps and Chemical School must be recognized respectively as the foundation and the Center of Excellence for the Combating CBRNE mission.
Recently the Chief of Chemical, Brigadier General Thomas Spoehr, announced, "All courses at the U.S. Army Chemical School and position titles within the Corps have been renamed from "Chemical" to "CBRN" to more accurately reflect the skills and capabilities we bring to the fight." 29 This is a great initiative, but all that is needed to better support national security and current policy is simply to add the "E" to CBRN.
The Explosive Ordnance Disposal technical specialty, which has for far too long been Some specialized units, such as the two Technical Escort Battalions are being redesigned to make them more capable of worldwide deployment. This is great progress, but in order to truly support the Army's modularity intent as well as the Joint Staffs force application functional concept for providing a more capable joint force to meet national objectives, the multi-purpose units we are creating need to have enhanced capabilities that are not limited to one or two specialized active component units. 34 The Army and Marine Corps have been approved for growth, however, the preponderance of the soldiers being added to force structure will be used to create more conventional warfare oriented combat brigades. 35 Krepinevich's assessment of the Army being too focused on conventional forces is correct; however, going one step further, the Army also needs to look at building organizations dedicated to full spectrum DSCA support.
These type units would be dedicated to this vital mission and allow combat units to strictly focus on combat missions. These DSCA formations could be tailored to perform multifunctional roles and be able to respond to events raging from wild fires, natural disaster response, to catastrophic WMD events at home and abroad. Some are arguing that the National Guard should have units specifically dedicated to this mission. While the National Guard certainly plays and will continue to play a pivotal role in emergency response, what is required is a full-time active component in a trained and ready status.
In his book "Where Are the WMDs?" Albert J. Mauroni offers a set of long-term strategic goals for improving CBRN defense capabilities. 36 First of his listed goals is the implementation of an aggressive education and outreach campaign to develop a senior leader constituency within the Army, OSD, and Congress. 37 The bottom line is that the Chemical Corps needs more general officer positions at the Department of the Army, and DoD. Additionally, our COCOMs need CBRN experts in the rank of colonel. Senior CBRNE leadership at the highest levels of DoD would greatly assist in their ability to educate and influence decision makers in a manner that properly address CBRNE strategic issues and shortfalls. 
Conclusion

